Helga Kuhse Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia Editor's note Ms Kuhse argues against the doctrine of 'the sanctity of life', against the application of acts and omissions doctrine in medical practice, and against the common assumption that there is a crucial moral difference between intentionally discontinuing ordinary medical treatment and intentionally discontinuing extra-ordinary medical treatment. Intentional acts or omissions which shorten life are in practice and must in theory be justified or rejected on the basis of the quality of life concerned, she argues. Such quality of life distinctions are needed in practice but they are logically incompatible with the doctrine of the sanctity of life; and the ordinaryl extraordinary means distinction cannot circumvent this incompatibility.
Father Hughes in his conmnentary rejects Ms Kuhse's extretne interpretation of sanctity of life doctrine. He argues that the distinction between acts and omissions is relevant to medical practice and distinguishes between two different senses of 'omission' to support this. He finds Ms Kuhse's reliance on quality of life excessively reductionist and argues that her position seems to commit her to denying any moral difference between intending a death by withholding extraordinary treatment and intending a death by administering a lethal injection. That there is an important moral distinction here is a crucial intuition which supporters of the traditional view wish to maintain, even though 'the difficulty ... is to discover a philosophical means to support it'. While sanctity of life doctrines need development, they express 'a healthy presumption in favour of trying to preserve it'. In a final response Ms Kuhse replies to her commentator.
Readers' attention is drawn also to the review by Professor Robin Downie on page 96 of a group of three papers entitled Prolongation of Life published by the Roman Catholic Linacre Centre.
Many discussions within medical ethics, explicitly or implicitly, appeal to and pivot on the 'sanctity-oflife' doctrine. Yet the really critical issues in medicine are often hidden by 'the hulking darkness of that concept'. Even those who disregard the clearly religious connotations (i) (io) .
On this view, not only does the distinction between acts and omissions not apply, but it is also irrelevant whether or not it is in the patient's interest to have his life prolonged. As one physician puts it: 'The patient entrusts his life to his doctor, and it is the doctor's duty to sustain it as long as possible. There should be no suggestion that it is possible for the doctor to do otherwise, even if it were decided that the patient were "better off dead" ' (ii However, a long history does not guarantee clarity and the Catholic Church has noted that even though the extraordinary means criterion 'as a principle still holds good', a reformulation is indicated 'by reason ofthe imprecision of the term and the rapid progress made in the treatment of sickness'. 'Thus', the recent Papal statement continues:
... some people prefer to speak of 'proportionate and 'disproportionate' means. In any case, it will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means by studying the type of treatment to be used, its degree of complexity or risk, its cost and the possibilities of using it, and comparing these elements with the result that can be expected, taking into account the state of the sick person and his or her physical and moral resources (2I).
In other words, a major factor in determining whether a means is optional, ie, extraordinary or disproportionate, is the 'state of the sick person' and 'the result that can be expected'. A means can thus be either extraordinary or ordinary, depending on the condition of the patient, and the adjective 'optional' ('extraordinary', 'disproportionate', 'artificial') refers not simply to the treatment considered on its own, but to the treatment considered in relation to the condition of the patient. As Bonnie Steinbock puts it: 'The concept is flexible, and what might be considered "extraordinary" in one situation might be ordinary in another' (22) . While the use of a respirator to sustain a patient through a severe but temporary respiratory ailment would be regarded as ordinary, its 'use to sustain the life of a severely brain-damaged person in an irreversible coma would be considered extraordinary' (22).
But here the term 'extraordinary' has been so relativised to the condition of the patient that it is precisely the condition ofthe patient that changes an ordinary means into an extraordinary one. The respirator becomes an extraordinary means because the-patient's condition is extraordinary, ie, the patient's condition is unusual in the sense that in this particular situation, and contrary to the absolute tenets of the 'sanctity-of-life' doctrine, the prolongation of the patient's life has become optional. But However, all three forms of treatnent have one thing in common: their continued application will prolong the patient's life. If it is thus permissible to discontinue treatment in the one case but not in the other two, a defender of this view must point to a morally relevant difference that distinguishes these cases. It is not, as we have seen, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means, considered simply as means, and it cannot be the distinction between the intentional and the nonintentional termination of life. Because if we accept (as most of us, even non-Catholics, would) that life can be terminated intentionally by either 'an action or an omission which of itself or by intention causes death' (25) , then withholding of insulin treatment or 'pulling the plug' of an iron lung would be examples of the intentional termination of life. But if 'pulling the plug' of a polio victim's iron lung is the intentional termination of life, then -surely -'pulling the plug' of Karen Quinlan's artificial respirator is too. (Suppose she had died as a result).
If there is a morally relevant difference between such cases, it must lie elsewhere. And so it does. It lies in the different qualities or types of life preserved by continued medical support. But quality-of-life criteria cannot be incorporated into a 'sanctity-oflife' ethic that regards all human life, irrespective of its type or quality, as of the same intrinsic worth. According to the 'sanctity-of-life' doctrine, comatose human life has the same 'sanctity' as the life of a conscious or self-conscious human being. Hence this doctrine is incompatible with the way the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means is drawn by Bishop Lawrence Casey and as it is presupposed by the recent Papal Declaration on Euthanasia.
The undefined use of the term 'human life' avoids a necessary task: it does not say what it is that gives value to human life; it does not say what principles should serve as possible justification for the termination or continuation of human life. While I have no way of refuting someone who holds that being physiologically alive, even though unconscious, is intrinsically valuable, I can refute all those who want to combine this position with a limited duty of lifepreservation in 'extraordinary' cases. The two positions are incompatible because the moral relevance ofthe adjective 'extraordinary', in this and many other cases, must rest on quality-of-life considerations, the moral relevance of which is being denied by the 'sanctity-of-life' doctrine.
The important point is this: we are faced not merely with a theoretical confusion, of interest only to philosophers and moral theologians, but with a misleading doctrine that has indefensible consequences in practice as well. Much of the current medical literature shows that there has been an implicit shift to quality-of-life standards (26) , and sociological studies indicate how certain qualitative factors enter into medical decision-making in life and death cases (27) . But from an ethical perspective the quality-of-life question is not adequately treated until and unless one gives morally relevant reasons as to why a certain quality or qualities should be decisive in terminating or continuing life-prolonging treatment (28) . In practice this means that the medical profession is, in the absence of such standards, faced with an anarchy of values and meaning.
Thus doctors have applied (29) , but -according to Steinbock - mongoloid child has such an obstruction, surgery becomes an 'extraordinary' procedure. Why? Not because the nature of the operation has changed, but because the child is a mongoloid. A mongoloid child's life is given a different value from that of a normal infant. The 'extraordinary means' criterion thus masks a quality-of-life judgment which may well require -but does not receive -further justification (why is it in a mongoloid infant's interest to die ?) (3I). Furthermore, if euthanasia for mongoloid infants can be justified, why then only for those with an intestional obstruction requiring a simple operation? The answer is that in the latter case, but not in the former, the 'extraordinary means' criterion can be invoked to mask a quality-of-life decision that is incommensurable with a 'sanctity-oflife' ethic.
By presenting quality-of-life decisions as an almost technical question, namely as one concerning 'means' which may or may not be optional, substantive moral issues are evaded. One of these is the question of what it is that we value when making quality-of-life decisions. If we decide that 'certain heroic intervention is not worthwhile' (32) , ie that the value of an individual's life is insufficient to warrant continuation of life-prolonging efforts, this requires a clear assessment of the locus of that value and if it derives from different sources, their relative weights. As long as such substantive criteria are not made explicit in medical decision-making, as long as we rely on the extreme flexibility of the concept of 'extraordinary means' to make a sanctity-of-life ethic superficially credible, we will engage in muddled practice. Doctors will let infants die by withholding 'extraordinary' or 'disproportionate' treatment on the basis 'that prognosis for meaningful life [is] extremely poor. . .' (33), without, however, being able to provide substantive criteria as to what,constitutes a 'meaningful life'; they will also resuscitate six times the 68-year-old doctor suffering from terminal cancer (34) on the basis that resuscitation is now an 'ordinary' procedure in the modern hospital setting. They will do so without being able to say what value or values they are trying to serve, other than to act in accordance with a 'sanctity-of-life' ethic that is impervious to the interests ofthe patient.
The point is that in our age of sophisticated medical technology death is often not 'imminent in spite of the means used' (35) . Death can often, quite literally, be kept waiting by the bed or the machine. It is only when supportive measures are discontinued that death becomes imminent. Discontinuing such measures is, unavoidably, a 'hastening of the hour of death' (35) . It Squirm as we may to avoid the inevitable, it seems time to admit to ourselves that there is simply no hiding place and that we must shoulder the responsibility of deciding to act in such a way as to hasten the declining trajectories of some lives, while doing our best to slow down the decline of others. And we have to do this on the basis ofsome judgment on the quality of lives in question (36) .
When the Nuer, an East African tribe, saw a need to do away with defective infants, they did it by classifying these defective infants as 'hippopotamusses', mistakenly born to human parents. These infants were put into the river -their natural habitat. This was not killing Nuer infants, it was doing what was appropriate for young hippopotamusses; and Nuer morality, prohibiting the taking of tribal life, could emerge unscathed (37).
When we allow defective infants to die by classifying as 'extraordinary' the means used to keep them alive, we are resorting to an equally spurious device in order to preserve unscathed our sanctityof-life ethic. If we want to go beyond definitional ploys, we must accept responsibility for our lifeand-death decisions, we must drop the traditional sanctity-of-life ethic and embrace a quality-of-life ethic instead.
